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Abstract.
 A framework for understanding and exploiting embodiment is
presented which is not dependent on any specific ontological context. This
framework is founded on a new definition of embodiment, based on the
relational dynamics that exist between biological organisms and their
environments, and inspired by the structural dynamics of the bacterium
Escherichia coli. Full recognition is given to the role played by physically
instantiated bodies, but in such a way that this can be meaningfully abstracted
within the constraints implied by the term ‘embodiment’, and applied in a
variety of operational contexts. This is illustrated by ongoing experimental
work in which the relational dynamics that exist between E. coli and its
environment are applied in a variety of software environments, using Cellular
Automata (CA) with artificial ‘sensory’ and ‘effector’ surfaces, producing
qualitatively similar ‘chemotactic’ behaviours in a variety of operational
domains.
1   Introduction
This paper is concerned with the nature of embodiment — it proposes a new and
precise definition of the term derived from asking ‘what is it that is special about the
relationship between bodies and the world?’ and then suggesting how the features that
are identified can be put to use independently of any specific ontological context. By
focusing on the relationship between a system and its environment as the basis for
embodiment, it is possible to analyse the significance of physical qualities without
grounding the analysis itself in a material ontology. Material features are significant in
so far as they condition the system-environment relationship, but not just because they
are material.
The definition of embodiment presented yields practical and conceptual benefits. It
provides a basis for quantifying embodiment, which is significant for behavioural
robotics, for example with regard to understanding how to calculate and maximise
embodiment, as well as understanding the problems that arise in moving between
simulation and actual physical environments (cf. [1]).
The ontological neutrality of the definition also enables inter-disciplinary
discussion about embodiment, for example between the behavioural robotics and
intelligent software agents communities. It does this by providing a common
framework for addressing embodiment — regardless of context — whilst recognising
the uniqueness of different forms of embodiment.
On the same basis, it can defuse the tension between Artificial Life (ALife) and
embodiment (cf. [2, 3]). From an ALife perspective, embodiment represents a
theoretically well-grounded alternative to the tradition of symbol manipulation in AI.
However, if physical embodiment is a necessary condition for the emergence of at
least some life-like behaviour, this bodes ill for the synthesis of such behaviours in
non-physical media — a central theme in ALife [4].
2   Embodiment and System - Environment Dynamics
Grounding embodiment in system-environment dynamics fits well with existing
bodies of research. Ray’s work on Tierra illustrates the significance of dynamics in
generating the phenomena associated with living systems [5].
Striking examples of analyses of ‘real world’ embodiment that appeal to dynamical
relationships between systems and the environments in which they are observed can
be found in, for example, [6, 7], and particularly in Beer’s work [8, 9].
Kushmerick [10] illustrates some of the difficulties of adherence to domain
specificity in embodiment, which become apparent when trying to apply lessons
learnt from the material world to that of the software agent. Without an underlying
definition of embodiment, transferral of lessons learnt in the material world can only
occur at the level of manifest phenomena, rather than at that of underlying or
generative causes.
Franklin comes closest to the spirit of the perspective advocated here, referring to
embodiment in terms of “autonomous agents structurally coupled with their
environment” [11]. Etzioni [12] adopts a similar stance.
3   Embodiment as Situated Structural Coupling between System
and Environment
We define what it is for a system to be embodied as follows:
A system X is embodied in an environment E if perturbatory channels exist
between the two. That is, X is embodied in E if for every time t at which both X
and E exist, some subset of E’s possible states have the capacity to perturb X’s
state, and some subset of X’s possible states have the capacity to perturb E’s
state.
This relational definition draws on Maturana and Varela’s influential notion of
structural coupling [13, 14]. At once, embodiment becomes quantifiable, ontology
independent and directly linked to behaviour.
Degrees of Embodiment. The definition above describes the conditions under which
structural coupling is possible. The mere fact that an object is embodied in an
environment is insufficient to guarantee that any interesting interaction will occur
between the two. It simply affords the possibility of perturbatory interaction.
There is huge scope for variation in this common embodiment relationship across
different instances of embodiment, be it as a result of design or natural development.
As the perturbatory relationship between system and environment is quantitatively
measurable, embodiment itself becomes measurable — expanding our viewpoint
beyond the issue of whether or not a particular system is embodied1. One possibility is
to ground a metric in the total complexity (as rigorously defined in [16], or
alternatively [17]) of the dynamical relationship between system and environment,
over all possible interactions. Factors such as the total bandwidth of the perturbatory
channels between system and environment, as well as the computational power in the
dynamics of their interaction, may contribute to this complexity.
Environmentally Coupled Cellular Automata as a Generic Class of Embodiable
Dynamical System. Cellular Automata (CA) designed to engage in a mutually
perturbatory relationship with some environment are suitable for exploring and
exploiting the embodiment relationship articulated above, in that they can participate
in the interaction defining such a relationship. Precedent for such a form of CA, in
contrast to the more common closed form (cf. [18, 19]) has been set by Varela’s
Bittorio [20] (see also [21] for a demonstration of CA–environment coupling in an
evolutionary context).
4   Bots and Bacteria — E. coli on the Internet
This section provides context for the definition of embodiment outlined above, by
illustrating how E. coli's autonomous and adaptive chemotactic behaviour emerges,
for an observer, from the embodiment relationship between bacterium and
environment. An experimental programme is underway, designed to explore this
definition of embodiment by instantiating the equivalent embodiment relationship
between a CA-based software system and a variety of ontologically distinct
operational environments.
Structural Dynamics in E. coli. Despite being far less structurally complex than
some multi-cellular organisms, and equipped with only non-directionally sensitive
receptors and effectively binary state effectors, E. coli exhibits adaptive and
consistently sensitive (cf. ‘dynamic range,’ below) chemotactic behaviour in response
to nutrient gradients over five orders of magnitude [22].
The dynamics of two structural processes play key roles in the emergence of E.
coli’s chemotaxis — highly connected signalling pathways within the cell and spatial
clustering of receptors on the surface of the bacterium [23] — operating within and in
relation to its physical environment via sensory and effector surfaces (nutrient
receptors and flagella, respectively).
The signalling pathway is a CA-like system, comprised of a number of
interconnected elements with relatively simple interaction rules between them.
Interactions are based on the transfer of phosphoryl groups, the presence of which at
flagella motor sites promotes ‘tumbling’ (random reorientation). Internal processes
produce phosphoryl groups, encouraging frequent tumbling. Encounters with
chemoattractants inhibit this process, shifting the behavioural bias towards ‘running’
(smooth swimming). In addition, receptors are constantly methylated, which promotes
tumbling, even at higher concentrations of chemoattractants (cf. [22] for more detail).
——————
1
 As suggested in [15] with respect to robots.
Receptor clustering plays a pivotal role in E. coli’s dynamic range [23]. This
occurs at low attractant concentrations, and has the effect of pooling the output of a
group of receptors when one member is activated. At higher concentrations the
receptors disperse, providing sensitivity to attractant binding that would be effectively
ignored by large clusters.
E. coli on the Internet. A Java program, ‘Phenomorph’, is under development. Its
relationship to Web pages is based on E. coli’s relationship to its environment. The
purpose is not to achieve optimal information search (cf. [24] [25]), but to investigate,
in conjunction with planned future experiments2, the validity of the concept of
embodiment presented above.
At the heart of Phenomorph lies a uniform 1D binary state environmentally
coupled CA which generates dynamics roughly analogous to those inherent in E.
coli’s structure. Receptor clustering and methylation are also simulated, whilst
keywords defined by the user at run-time play the part of chemoattractants. When
Phenomorph visits a web page containing defined keywords, the CA is
proportionately stimulated. The CA global activation level determines the likelihood
that Phenomorph will ‘run’ rather than ‘tumble,’ each of which are implemented
through hyperlink following. See [26] for a more detailed description of Phenomorph.
Initial Evaluation. Although not yet developed sufficiently to produce infotaxis3, and
lacking comparative studies in other operational environments, Phenomorph shows a
variety of autonomously generated responses to environmental features, which arise
directly from and are determined solely by the interplay between the environment and
its CA-based structural dynamics. Environmental variety is constantly filtered by the
(very simple) form of Phenomorph’s embodiment.
5   Conclusions
The definition of embodiment presented offers immediate opportunities to bridge the
interpretative gap between disciplines concerned with very different forms of
embodiment, something previously hampered not least by the lack of any firm
definition of the term. This understanding of embodiment has the potential to provide
benefits to practitioners on both sides of the ontological divide between physical and
non-physical systems and environments — from measuring the embodiment of robots
to evolving distributed autonomous control systems that exploit emergent behavioural
strategies across a range of operational environments. A great deal of experimental
work also remains to be done investigating this concept of embodiment across
operational environments, and developing possibilities for its exploitation.
——————
2
 These will consist of embodying Phenomorph, via appropriate sensory and effector surfaces,
in an abstract parameter space, and a physical environment.
3
 An informatic counterpart of chemotaxis. Phenomorph has yet to attain a level of behavioural
‘fitness’ that can be compared with that of the acutely honed E. coli.
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